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Abstract 
 
Secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve efficiency and increase access to 
credit.  In part, this is because of their greater ability to manage risk.  However, the degree to 
which secondary markets expand access to credit is virtually unknown.  Using the mortgage 
market as an example, we begin to fill that gap.  Our conceptual model suggests that secondary 
credit markets have potentially ambiguous effects on interest rates, but unambiguous positive 
effects on the number of loans issued.  We focus our empirical analysis on the latter using 1992-
2004 HMDA files for conventional, conforming, home purchase loans in conjunction with 
Census tract data. 
 
Findings confirm that an active secondary market increases mortgage origination rates.  Between 
2000 and 2004, for example, conventional loan purchases increased the share of applications 
originated by 15.6 percent, on average, roughly halving the denial rate (all else equal).  In the 
high risk subprime sector, the analogous figure is 10.9 percent, while the marginal impact of 
secondary market purchases on origination rates is 3 to 10 times larger than for the market 
overall.  These findings confirm that secondary markets provide opportunities to manage risk 
more effectively and increase access to credit.  Evidence of a higher marginal impact of 
secondary markets among high-risk borrowers is especially important given recent government 
efforts to expand lending activity in low-income communities. 
 
1. Introduction 
Secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve efficiency because of their 
greater ability to manage risk, enhance liquidity, and arbitrage regional imbalances in the supply 
and demand for credit.  Although in principle these features should result in greater access to 
credit, the magnitude of such effects is largely unknown and has only rarely been studied.1  That 
lack of information is striking, especially in light of recent dramatic expansion of the secondary 
market for mortgages.  This paper begins begin to fill that gap. 
Between 1992 and 2002, secondary market purchases of conventional home purchase 
(CHP) loans boomed, rising from 71 to 93 percent of CHP originations (see Table 1).2  
Expansion of secondary market activity has been even more dramatic among low-income and 
minority neighborhoods.  Among low-income communities, purchases jumped from 33 percent 
of originations in 1992 to 81 percent in 2002; over this same period, among predominantly 
African American and Hispanic neighborhoods, the ratio of purchases to originations jumped by 
roughly 38 and 40 percentage points, respectively (see Table 1).  This rapid increase in 
secondary market activity provides an opportunity to study the impact of secondary credit 
markets in general and the mortgage market in particular. 
 The rapid growth in the secondary mortgage market has been facilitated by policies and 
institutions largely put into place by the federal government over the past 40 years.   Most 
notable, those efforts include the establishment of government and government-sponsored 
                                                 
1Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2007) argue that as credit markets become more efficient, families should increasingly 
base their home purchase decisions on permanent rather than current income, and therefore, place increasing weight 
on future income.  Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they find evidence of a discrete increase 
in such behavior in the early- to mid-1980s, consistent with innovations in the mortgage market at that time.  Apart 
from this study, we are not aware of other research that provides direct evidence of the impact of mortgage market 
innovations on access to credit. 
 
2Here we define the secondary market purchase rate as the ratio of secondary market loan purchases to primary 
market loan originations. 
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secondary mortgage market enterprises (GSEs), the most prominent of which are Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.3  Investors in the mortgage-backed securities of the GSEs attribute an 
“implicit” U.S. Government guarantee to those securities.  In 2002, the GSEs accounted for 
roughly 60 percent of secondary market purchases of conventional home purchase loans.  
Moreover, the GSE charters mandate that these institutions enhance the supply of credit to low-
income, minority, and other underserved communities.  Despite this extensive level of 
government involvement, there is a stunning lack of evidence on the impact of secondary 
markets on access to credit. 
The belief that secondary markets enhance efficiency is based on scale economies: a large 
secondary market can increase liquidity in the funding of mortgages, arbitrage regional 
imbalances in the supply and demand for credit, and more effectively manage risk associated 
with lending outcomes.  Of these mechanisms, our focus will be on risk.  In Section 2, a simple 
conceptual model is presented in which loan rates clear the market.  Under those conditions, an 
active secondary market lowers lending rates and systematic denials of loan applications do not 
occur.  In practice, however, 16 percent of conventional home purchase mortgage loan 
applications are denied (see Table 1).  If those denials arise because lenders sometimes make 
mistakes and deny profitable loans, or borrowers occasionally apply for credit that they clearly 
cannot afford, then the basic supply-demand model prevails.  However, if denials arise because 
of concerns about moral hazard and adverse selection that exacerbate interest rate and default 
                                                 
 
3Fannie Mae was initially an agency of the U.S. Government, created in 1938 to make a secondary market in FHA 
mortgages.  In 1968, Fannie Mae became a federally-chartered GSE owned solely by private investors, the primary 
role of which was to provide lenders with a ready market for their mortgage assets and to assist in promoting 
uniformly defined mortgage instruments.  Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to make a secondary market in the non-
FHA mortgages originated by the savings and loan associations.  In addition to establishing these GSEs, the Federal 
government has also facilitated the creation of loan insurance programs, helped to standardize mortgage loan 
instruments and underwriting, and enhanced the availability of hazard and title insurance.  
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risk, then arguments based on the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of equilibrium credit rationing 
imply a different set of outcomes. 
As outlined by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), when borrowers display observable differences 
in risk attributes, competitive markets will charge higher risk borrowers higher loan rates.  Such 
risk-based pricing has become increasingly common in the mortgage market with the emergence 
of “prime” versus “sub-prime” lending, and has been the longstanding practice in markets for 
commercial and industrial loans.  But Stiglitz and Weiss further point out that under certain 
market conditions, the highest risk group to receive credit (e.g. sub-prime) may be subject to 
equilibrium credit rationing.  When we extend the simple supply-demand model to allow for this 
possibility, the impact of secondary markets on loan rates in the sub-prime sector is ambiguous.  
On the other hand, regardless of whether loan rates clear the market, an active secondary market 
has an unambiguous positive effect on the share of loan applications that are originated.  Partly 
for that reason, the primary focus of our empirical work is to measure the extent to which 
secondary market activity increases mortgage origination rates. 
Summary measures based on data provided by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) provide a first indication of the relationship between secondary market activity and 
access to credit.  In Table 1, notice that in 2002, those MSAs with the lowest conventional home 
purchase (CHP) loan application denial rates (denials divided by the number of applications) had 
unusually high levels of secondary market purchases relative to originations, and vice-versa.  
Clearly, increased secondary market activity is strongly correlated with improved access to 
mortgage credit. 
As implicitly suggested in Table 1, we base our analysis on a largely overlooked feature 
of the HMDA data.  Specifically, HMDA provides detailed information on secondary market 
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purchases of mortgage loans.  But with the exception of a few early studies (see, for example, 
Canner and Gabriel (1993), Bunce and Scheessele (1996), Manchester, Neal and Bunce (1998), 
and Bunce (2002)), HMDA information on secondary market loan purchases has been virtually 
ignored.  Instead, researchers and regulators have largely utilized HMDA data to analyze 
primary market lender accept/reject decisions of loan applications.4  These studies have typically 
focused on the role of applicant race and ethnicity with corresponding implications for 
discrimination and fair lending practices.  Although these studies have been influential, they also 
have been controversial.  This is because of well known limitations of HMDA: the data do not 
provide information on loan applicant wealth and credit history; however, those controls are 
critical to lender assessments of borrower credit worthiness in the accept/reject decision.5 
Our study avoids the limitations of the HMDA data while drawing on its strengths.  This 
is because secondary market purchase decisions are not based on the attributes of the individual 
borrowers.  Instead, secondary market purchasers consider the broad features of loan pools that 
trade in the secondary market.  The GSEs, for example, largely purchase pools of conventional 
loans that conform to their loan size and underwriting guidelines.  That information is available 
in the HMDA data.  In addition, while secondary market purchase decisions are often influenced 
by neighborhood socioeconomic (SES) attributes – indeed, GSE regulations require Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to purchase a share of their loans in low-income and minority communities – 
                                                 
4See, for example, Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1994), Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney (1996), Avery, 
Beeson, and Calem (1997), Huck (2001), and Dietrich (2002). 
  
5As a result, early accept/reject studies that did not control for borrower wealth and credit history created a virtual 
firestorm of debate.  In response to those concerns, Munnell et al (1996) supplemented HMDA records in Boston 
with analysis of individual-level loan files, which included information on borrower wealth and credit scores as well 
as other borrower-level determinants of loan performance.  Results from that study confirmed that minorities in 
Boston were more likely to have their loan applications rejected than comparable white mortgage applicants.  Other 
studies using HMDA data have focused on subprime lending in low-income markets (see, for example, Harvard 
Joint Center for Housing Studies (2002)), or the share of primary market originations that are documented in the 
HMDA data (see, for example, Berkovec and Zorn (1996), FFIEC (1996)).  
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that information may be obtained from the decennial Census.  Combining HMDA and Census 
data, we are able to bring to bear much of the information used by secondary institutions when 
deciding whether to purchase loans from primary market lenders. 
Nevertheless, challenges remain.  Most important, our conceptual model suggests that key 
measures of mortgage market activity (originations, applications, denials, and purchases) are 
simultaneously determined.  To address that concern, in the origination share regressions we 
instrument in two ways for endogenous secondary market purchases.  First, we instrument for 
purchases using the “underserved” status of the census tract as defined by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development: specifically, whether tract median income is less than 90 
percent of area (MSA) median income, or AMI.  As HUD requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
to purchase over 30 percent of their loans in such tracts, this measure provides an exogenous 
policy-induced motive for secondary market purchases.  The main limitation associated with the 
use of underserved tract status as an instrument is that tract income affects demand and supply 
for credit as well.  To address that issue, we include a long list of tract SES attributes from 1990 
(coded to year-2000 tract geography) in all of our models, including tract average income and 
income squared.6  It is through the discrete change in tract status upon passing the 90 percent 
AMI income threshold that we gain our identification. 
In a second IV approach, we estimate the origination share models using 1980 SES 
attributes of the census tracts (coded to year-2000 tract geography).  Those instruments 
complement 1990 census tract attributes that are included directly in the model to control for 
demand and risk attributes of the applicant pool.  Identification in this case is possible because 
tract SES attributes change between decades and we assume that lagged SES attributes are 
                                                 
6Also included in all of the origination share and purchase regressions are MSA fixed effects for the larger MSAs 
and MSA-size category fixed effects for the smaller metro areas.  These fixed effects further control for the 
influence of MSA-wide unobserved factors such as variations in mortgage interest rates, local policy, and more.  
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exogenous to contemporaneous mortgage market activity.  However, one could argue that 1980 
SES attributes could be included directly in the models to help control for unobserved 
contemporaneous SES attributes not captured by the 1990 SES control variables.  For that 
reason, results based on the underserved status instrument are preferred.   
Our results yield several new insights.  First, in each year from 1992 to 2004, secondary 
market purchases significantly increase the share of applications originated by primary lenders.  
Between 2000 and 2004, for example, loan purchases increased the share of applications 
originated by 15.6 percent, on average, roughly equal to the denial rate in 2004 (all else held 
constant).  This suggests that secondary market activity halved the share of applications denied.  
Among lenders that specialize in high risk subprime loans, the analogous figure is 10.9 percent, 
somewhat smaller than for the market overall because of the lesser scale of sub-prime activity in 
the secondary market.7  At the margin, however, secondary market purchases in the subprime 
sector increase origination rates by an amount 3 to 10 times larger than for the market overall.  
The larger marginal impact of secondary markets on high-risk segments of the mortgage market 
suggests the importance of the secondary market to risk management and to the extension of 
credit to underserved population groups. 
As a final set of exercises, note that if mortgage markets are well-functioning, then 
primary lenders should not deny loans that could profitably be sold into the secondary market, 
and denials should have no effect on secondary market purchases.8  We estimate this relationship 
to provide further background evidence on the operation of the mortgage market.  Note, 
                                                 
7In Table 2 (Panels A and C) it is apparent that the level of secondary market purchases is much lower in the sub-
prime sector than for the market overall, but in Table 3a (Panels A and C) the estimated marginal effect of secondary 
market purchases is sharply higher in the sub-prime sector relative to the entire market.  A more detailed discussion 
of these patterns is provided later in the paper. 
 
8It is worth emphasizing that these arguments hold regardless of whether loan rates clear the market.  
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however, that because underserved tract status is a determinant of secondary market activity we 
cannot use underserved status as an instrument.  Instead, for the purchase regressions, we 
estimate using the 1980 SES variables as instruments, and also the non-IV model.  In both the 
non-IV and IV models, for most years, denials had small effects on purchases.  Along with 
evidence that secondary markets increase originations, these patterns confirm that an active 
secondary market improves the efficiency with which mortgage credit is provided, and in so 
doing, increases access to credit.  
To clarify these and other results, we proceed as follows.  Section 2 develops the 
conceptual model used to clarify the impact of secondary market activity on primary market 
outcomes.  Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and model.  Sections 4 and 5 report on data 
and estimation results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Model 
The goal of this section is to clarify two key features of the analysis.  First, and most 
important, how does an active secondary market affect the share of loan applications that are 
originated in the primary market and hence the availability of credit?  Second, to what extent do 
loan denials in the primary market affect secondary market purchases?  As will become apparent, 
these questions are related.  Each is considered in turn, beginning with the first. 
 
2.1 The influence of secondary market purchases on the primary market 
As suggested in the Introduction, it is widely believed that an active secondary market for 
mortgage credit improves efficiency and expands the supply of loanable funds.  This occurs in 
part because scale economies associated with the secondary market enhance opportunities to 
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manage various sources of risk.9  As an example, local house price declines, employment shocks, 
or natural disasters could prove catastrophic to local lenders if they held large stocks of 
mortgages in portfolio.  But those risks are greatly mitigated in the secondary market because of 
its enhanced ability to diversify investments across regions and loan types.10 
Consider now a stylized model of the primary market for mortgage credit in which all 
markets are competitive and markets clear in equilibrium.  The model is portrayed in the four 
quadrant diagram in Figure 1.  In the upper right quadrant, loan demand varies with the attributes 
of the local population (Z) including credit history, income, and other socio-economic factors 
that influence housing preferences.  Loan demand also declines with an increase in the mortgage 
interest rate in the usual way.  Loan supply increases with the mortgage rate and is sensitive to 
the risk-free cost of funds (c), prepayment and default risk that are sensitive both to economy-
wide shocks and the attributes of the applicant pool (Z), and the presence of the secondary 
market.  The manner in which these factors affect the supply of credit is clarified below. 
Suppose first that lenders face no risk of any kind.  Under those conditions, in the lower 
right quadrant of Figure 1, the expected return or yield to holders of mortgage credit is the 
mortgage interest rate.  This is shown by the 45 degree line.  It should also be emphasized that 
this is an accounting relationship – equilibrium features of the market will be dealt with in the 
upper right quadrant.11 
                                                 
9Secondary markets also improve liquidity and smooth out regional imbalances in supply and demand for credit.  In 
the empirical work to follow, we allow for these effects by including MSA fixed effects that control for MSA-wide 
factors including interest rates, as well as the local demand for credit. 
 
10This certainly was the case in the early 1980s in Texas when oil prices crashed causing many families that worked 
in the oil industry to default on their mortgages.  Another recent example is New Orleans following Hurricane 
Katrina. 
 
11To simplify, the discussion below assumes that mortgage origination and servicing costs are zero.  This does not 
affect the nature of the results. 
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Consider next the influence of economy-wide shocks such as uncertainty about future 
interest rate paths.  As is well known, increases in market rates above the loan contract rate erode 
the value of outstanding debt.  Sufficient declines in interest rates, however, prompt refinance 
activity whereby existing debt is prepaid at lower current market rates.  Holders of mortgage 
debt, therefore, suffer when rates rise but do not benefit in a corresponding manner when rates 
fall.  For this reason, interest rate volatility is costly to lenders, and this is commonly referred to 
as interest rate risk.  Moreover, it is well documented that interest rates are more volatile when 
rate levels are high.  Accordingly, lender costs associated with interest rate risk increase with the 
loan rate, and this causes the return (yield) function in the lower right quadrant of the diagram to 
bend up and away from the 45 degree line. 
Consider now the influence of borrower attributes (Z) on default and prepayment risk, 
where the latter includes refinance activity as above and also the propensity of borrowers to 
move and prepay their loans.12  Moreover, it is realistic to assume that lenders have only 
imperfect information about Z.  Under these conditions, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others 
argue that as loan rates increase, adverse selection and moral hazard erode the quality of the loan 
applicant pool.  For example, higher rates may skew the applicant pool towards individuals who 
are more prone to refinance.  That is because at higher loan rates individuals who tend not to 
refinance perceive increasing borrowing costs and disproportionately drop out of the applicant 
pool (an adverse selection effect).  Analogously, higher rates may encourage borrowers to 
purchase homes in areas subject to greater house price volatility (with greater potential capital 
gains and loses), or perhaps to seek higher initial loan-to-value ratios, both of which increase the 
likelihood of default (a moral hazard effect).  These effects are costly to lenders, increase with 
                                                 
12Default, of course, is costly to lenders, as is prepayment risk. 
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the loan rate, and further bend upwards the return function in the lower right quadrant of the 
figure. 
Suppose now that a secondary market is introduced.  Because the secondary market 
manages risk more effectively, this reduces the cost of the above sources of risk and rotates the 
return function back down towards the 45 degree line.  In the lower left quadrant, as the expected 
yield on loans increases, the number of loans supplied increases.  Moving clockwise around the 
diagram, the supply of credit in the upper right quadrant takes on a concave shape, and is 
sensitive to the risk free cost of funds (c), economy-wide shocks, the level of risk associated with 
a given pool of applicants, and the presence of the secondary market.  Moreover, it is clear that 
the presence of the secondary market causes the loan supply function to rotate up, increasing the 
supply of loanable funds for any given mortgage rate.  In equilibrium, this causes market interest 
rates to fall from r* to r** and the number of loans originated to rise from L* to L**: because 
secondary markets manage risk more efficiently, loan rates fall and originations rise. 
The simple model just outlined is instructive, but incomplete.  In particular, summary 
measures in Table 1 indicate that in 2004 roughly 16 percent of conventional home purchase 
mortgage applications were denied.  However, if all markets clear in equilibrium in the manner 
described in Figure 1, there is no room for denials.  We consider this issue next. 
 
2.2 Denials of mortgage loan applications 
Two very different mechanisms may generate the denials of loans applications observed 
in Table 1.  The first is simply that borrowers and primary lenders sometimes make mistakes.13  
To be precise, borrowers may sometimes mistakenly apply for loans that would not be profitable 
to originate, and lenders may sometimes mistakenly deny loans that could have been profitable 
                                                 
13We thank Larry Wall for emphasizing this point in comments on an earlier draft of the paper. 
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to originate.  Under these conditions, the model in Figure 1 remains viable, at least as an 
approximation. 
A second very different explanation for loan denials is that lenders systematically ration 
credit through terms other than the interest rate.  To model this idea we draw upon section IV (p. 
406) of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  As a starting point, suppose that loan applicants can be 
grouped according to observable differences in credit risk.  Then competitive lenders would 
charge higher rates to higher risk groups to compensate for the higher expected costs of late loan 
payments, refinancing, default, and the like.  Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, risk-based 
pricing has become increasingly prevalent in the U.S. mortgage market, including the emergence 
of “prime” and “sub-prime” lending, the latter of which entails more risk.  Moreover, Stiglitz and 
Weiss argue that whereas the highest risk group to receive credit may be subject to equilibrium 
credit rationing, lower risk groups are not.  We will clarify the intuition behind the Stiglitz-Weiss 
result below.  For now, note that their result suggests that Figure 1 is likely a good 
approximation of the market for prime lending in the mortgage market, but not necessarily for 
the sub-prime sector.  With this in mind, the discussion below focuses on the sub-prime portion 
of the mortgage market, the highest risk group to receive mortgage credit. 
We consider two cases.  In the first case, the secondary market is not present but credit 
rationing may occur.  This is portrayed in Figure 2a.  The key difference from Figure 1 is in the 
lower right quadrant.  Observe that the expected rate of return on the pool of loans issued 
initially increases with the mortgage interest rate, reaches a peak, and then declines with further 
increases in the mortgage rate.  This hump-shaped pattern is a central to the Stiglitz-Weiss 
(1981) model.  In our context, the pattern owes its form to the assumption that as mortgage 
interest rates increase, interest rate risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard become so costly 
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that the expected yield on loans issued begins to decline.  Tracing through to the upper right 
quadrant, the hump-shaped return function causes mortgage supply to be hump-shaped as well. 
Two possibilities now arise.  In the first case, demand intersects supply on the upward 
sloping portion of the supply curve.  In this case, all loan applications are accepted and no loans 
are denied.  In the second, demand intersects supply on the downward sloping portion of the 
supply curve.  In this case, relative to the market clearing interest rate (r*), lenders can do better 
by lowering the mortgage rate so as to increase the number of loans originated.  As shown in the 
lower right quadrant, this would raise the expected rate of return on loans issued.  Moreover, this 
will continue until mortgage rates are reduced to r**, a level equal to the peak in the mortgage 
supply function.  It is worth emphasizing that at r**, the equilibrium mortgage interest rate, 
excess demand for funds is present in the marketplace and lenders deny some of the loan 
applications received. 
Consider now why the description above may apply to the sub-prime sector but is not 
likely to hold for the prime segment of the mortgage market.  As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
one must assume that the peak in the loan supply function for the high-risk group is associated 
with a lower expected return (yield) relative to the corresponding peak for the low-risk group.  
That would be consistent with the classification of loan applicants into low- and high-risk 
categories.  Suppose now that sub-prime borrowers receive loans and are subject to credit 
rationing.  As above, they would be charged loan rates associated with the peak in their loan 
supply function.  The same would be true for prime borrowers if they too were subject to credit 
rationing.  But if both groups were subject to credit rationing, lenders would profit by diverting 
loans from sub-prime borrowers to prime loan applicants that had been denied.  With 
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competitive markets, therefore, it is likely that only the highest risk group to receive credit is 
exposed to credit rationing, and Figure 2a applies to just the sub-prime sector.14 
In Figure 2b, we assume now that credit rationing is present and add in the secondary 
mortgage market.  As before, the secondary mortgage market increases the expected rate of 
return for any given mortgage rate, and this causes the loan supply function in the upper right 
quadrant to rotate up.  As a result, unambiguously, denials of loan applications are reduced while 
loan originations increase.  Interestingly, however, equilibrium mortgage interest rates could in 
principle either fall or rise. 
 
2.3 Testable implications of an active secondary market 
The arguments above suggest that secondary markets have an ambiguous effect on 
mortgage interest rates in the high-risk sector and this complicates efforts to assess the efficiency 
gains associated with an active secondary market.15  On the other hand, secondary markets have 
unambiguous positive effects on loan originations in all segments of the mortgage market.  For 
that reason, in the empirical work to follow, our primary focus will be on measuring the extent to 
which an active secondary market increases the share of mortgage applications that are 
originated.  Moreover, drawing upon the discussion above, there is good reason to expect that 
secondary market effects on originations would be greatest in the sub-prime segment of the 
market; this will be tested. 
                                                 
14See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for further details of this argument. 
  
15Lehnart, Passmore, and Sherlund (2005)), for example, find that GSE portfolio purchases and MBS issuance have 
negligible effects on mortgage interest rate spreads.  Lehnart et al (2005) further finds that purchases are not more 
effective than securitization in reducing mortgage interest rate spreads.  Findings from both studies, however, could 
be obscured by differential interest rate effects from secondary market activity. 
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Our discussion above also implicitly suggests a second set of tests that are potentially 
revealing.  Specifically, if primary lenders only deny loans that the secondary market could not 
profitably manage, then such denials should not affect the number of loans purchased by the 
secondary market.16  On the other hand, if primary lenders sometimes mistakenly deny loans that 
the secondary market would have purchased, those denials should reduce secondary market 
purchases.  Hence, evidence that denials have small effects on secondary market purchases 
would be suggestive that primary lenders are cognizant of their opportunities to profitably sell 
loans to the secondary market, thereby achieving a more efficient outcome.17 
 
3. Empirical Model 
3.1 Origination regression 
Our empirical work is guided by the relationships outlined in Figures 1 through 2b.  
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that prime (low-risk) and sub-prime (high-risk) 
segments of the market may be segmented and subject to different equilibrium loan rates.  
Bearing that in mind, in the discussion below, we develop our estimating equations for the most 
general case that allows for the possibility of credit rationing. 
We begin by recognizing that originations in period t (Lt) equal applications (At) minus 
denials (Dt), 
t t tL A D≡ −  .         (3.1) 
 
                                                 
16More generally, any loans originated by primary market lenders must be ones that they want to hold in portfolio or 
that secondary market investors would want to purchase.  
 
17A further implication of the model is that denial rates should be higher in the sub-prime sector to the extent that 
that sector is subject to credit rationing but the prime sector is not.  We return to this point later in the paper. 
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Applications are simply another name for demand and depend on mortgage rates (rt) and the 
attributes of the applicant pool (Zt), 
( , )t t tA A r Z= .         (3.2) 
 
The supply of mortgage credit is sensitive to whether a credit rationing equilibrium prevails, and 
also the presence of the secondary market,  
( )( , , )    , 0
( )( , , ) , 0
clear
t t
t t t
t clear
max t t
t t t
S rS r P Z
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S rS r P Z
r
⎧ ⎫∂
>⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪∂= ⎨ ⎬
∂⎪ ⎪<⎪ ⎪∂⎩ ⎭
 .      (3.3) 
 
Note that rmax is the mortgage rate associated with the peak of the loan supply function in the 
upper right quadrant of Figure 2b and rclear is the market clearing rate. 
 Equilibrium in the market is as described in Figure 2b and depends on whether the loan 
demand function intersects the supply function at a downward or upward sloping point.  
Accordingly, the equilibrium number of loans originated is given by, 
*
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The number of loans denied in equilibrium can then be obtained by differencing (3.2) and (3.3) 
at the equilibrium mortgage rate, 
*
( )0  , 0
( )( , ) ( , , ) , 0
clear
t t
t clear
max max t t
t t t t t t t
S r
rD
S rA r Z L r P Z
r
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>⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪∂= ⎨ ⎬
∂⎪ ⎪− <⎪ ⎪∂⎩ ⎭
 .    (3.5) 
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As noted earlier, in a non-credit rationing equilibrium, markets clear and systematic denials are 
zero.  However, when credit rationing prevails, loan denials equal the difference between At and 
Lt, as implied by (3.1). 
 It is also useful to formally recognize that equilibrium mortgage rates depend on all of the 
arguments of the demand and supply functions, 
* ( , , )t t t tr r c P Z= .        (3.6) 
Thus, equilibrium mortgage rates depend on the risk free cost of funds (ct), the intensity of 
secondary market purchase activity, and also the observable characteristics of the loan 
applicants. 
Using these expressions, we seek to analyze the impact of secondary market activity on 
access to credit.  There are two channels by which this occurs.  The first is through the effect of 
secondary market activity on mortgage interest rates as in (3.6).  The second channel is through 
the effect of secondary market activity on loan denials conditional on the mortgage rate, with 
related implications for originations.  The influence of secondary markets on mortgage rates has 
been the focus of recent work (see Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherland (2005), for example) and we 
do not seek to evaluate that relationship here.18  Instead, as noted earlier, this study focuses on 
the extent to which secondary market purchases increase the share of applications that are 
originated.19  We proceed as follows. 
                                                 
18In the empirical model to follow, we control for inter-metropolitan variability in mortgage rates by including MSA 
and MSA size-related fixed effects in the estimating equations. 
   
19In earlier versions of the paper we experimented with estimating the impact of secondary market activity on 
denials as opposed to originations.  For two reasons, however, we favor the focus on originations.  First, there are 
many more census tracts with zero denials as compared to originations.  Focusing on originations therefore reduces 
the sensitivity to censored dependent variables (Tobit models are used in the estimation nevertheless).  Second, and 
more importantly, our goal is to isolate the impact of secondary markets on access to credit.  But some denied 
applications will be resubmitted to the same or alternate lenders and ultimately be approved.  As such, denials 
overstate the effect of secondary markets on access to credit, whereas originations provide a direct measure of the 
outcome of primary interest. 
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In each time period t, the share of loan applications that are originated is given by s, 
where s is bounded below by zero and above by 1: 
    ,      0 1t t tL s A for s= ≤ ≤         (3.7) 
From the expressions above, A depends on r and Z, while s also depends on secondary market 
purchases, P, since st = (At – Dt)/At.  Accordingly, we specify s as 
, 1, 2,( , , )  ,       1t t t
t o t t tt tr b Pb Z bs r P Z e for s
+ +
= ≤       (3.8) 
Taking logs and rearranging, 
, 1, 2,log( / )  ,       log( / ) 0t t t o t t t t t t tL A rb Pb Z b for L A= + + ≤     (3.9) 
In (3.9), note that Z and P vary within metropolitan areas, but mortgage rates, r, are 
largely invariant within individual cities, and even across broad regions of the country.  
Accordingly, we replace rtbo,t with MSA fixed effects for larger MSAs and MSA-size category 
fixed effects for smaller MSAs.20  Our estimating equation is then given by, 
, 1, 2,log( / )  ,       log( / ) 0t t MSA t t t t t t tL A Pb Z b for L Aθ= + + ≤     (3.10) 
Note that θMSA,t controls for MSA-wide mortgage rates as well as any other unobserved factors 
common to census tracts throughout a given MSA (or group of MSAs for the smaller cities). 
From the discussion above, local socio-demographic attributes, Z, shift both borrower 
demand (A) and the lenders’ supply of credit by influencing taste for credit and credit risk, 
respectively.  For this reason, the coefficients on Z are reduced form and reflect the influence of 
both demand and supply factors.  In contrast, P does not affect demand, but does influence the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
20In total, 30 such fixed effects were included in the model.  These included 24 fixed effects for each of the largest 
MSAs in the U.S. in 2000 (MSAs with over 500 census tracts), and 6 fixed effects for different size categories of 
MSAs with fewer than 500 census tracts in 2000. 
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supply of credit.  Our estimate of b2, therefore, measures the impact of secondary market activity 
on the willingness of primary lenders to supply credit and is expected to be positive.21 
 
3.2 Purchase regression 
As discussed earlier, a further implicit implication of our model is that primary market 
lenders should deny only those loans that cannot be profitably sold into the secondary market (or 
held in portfolio).  Under these conditions, D should have no effect on P.  On the other hand, P is 
clearly affected by L since L represents the supply of loans potentially available for purchase in 
the secondary market.  Our second estimating equation, therefore, examines the impact of denials 
on the share of originations purchased by the secondary market.  The estimating equation is, 
MSA,t 1 2 t 2,/   Z   t t t tP L p D p eφ= + + +  .      (3.11) 
 
If primary lenders deny loans that could have been profitably sold into the secondary market, 
then p1 should be negative.  However, with the advent of increasingly effective information 
technology and the general sophistication of the mortgage market, one would expect such 
outcomes to be relatively infrequent.  If that is the case, then the coefficient on p1 should be 
small. 
 
                                                 
21Given the structure in (3.10), it is tempting to analyze the impact of Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) and 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations on the availability or mortgage credit.  CRA, for example, 
requires that primary market lenders extend credit to underserved neighborhoods, while GSE regulations require that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase a minimum share of their loans from low-income and minority 
neighborhoods.  However, by specifying Z in a very general and reduced form manner, this makes precise 
interpretation of the coefficients on Z difficult.  The payoff is that specifying Z in this manner helps to ensure that Z 
soaks up unobserved credit risk associated with the applicant pool, and in so doing, allows us to obtain consistent 
estimates of b2, a primary goal of this paper.  Partly for that reason, analysis of the influence of CRA and GSE 
regulations and the GSEs in general is left for a future paper in which a more structured approach is applied to the 
specification of Z.  
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3.3 Endogenous regressors 
A final consideration is that the mortgage market control variables in (3.10) and (3.11) 
may be endogenous.  Accordingly, as outlined in the Introduction, when estimating the 
origination share regressions we employ two strategies.  First, we instrument for purchases using 
the underserved status of the census tracts.  At the same time, we control for a long list of 1990 
tract socioeconomic attributes, including average income and average income squared.  Second, 
we estimate the origination share equations using 1980 tract socioeconomic attributes as 
instruments for endogenous secondary market purchases.22  This latter approach is also used 
when estimating the purchase regressions.  Strengths and limitations of the two approaches are as 
described in the Introduction. 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Sources and variables 
As noted in the Introduction, data for the analysis were obtained from the Home 
Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the decennial Census.  Specifically, we drew upon 
the HMDA data files for every even year from 1992 to 2004 and census tract socio-demographic 
attributes obtained from 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses.  The census tract data 
were obtained from Geolytics, Inc. and were coded to year 2000 census tract boundaries for each 
of the decades we draw upon.  All of the HMDA data was initially reported by financial 
institutions and coded by FFIEC based on 1990 census tract geography.  We converted these data 
to year-2000 census tract geography.  This ensures that we follow the same neighborhoods over 
time and facilitates proper matching of the HMDA and Census files across years. 
                                                 
22Results were similar when 1970 tract attributes were used as instruments instead of 1980 values.  However, the 
geographic coverage of census tracts in 1970 was not as extensive as in 1980.  For this reason, we report only results 
using the 1980 instruments. 
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Mortgage market variables included in the models are as defined in Section 2.  Summary 
statistics for all of the key mortgage market variables are provided in Tables 1 and 2.  Elements 
of Z obtained from the Census data include tract-level measures of socio-demographic and 
economic variables.  These include racial composition, educational characteristics, income, 
gender, unemployment, poverty status, the presence of female-headed families with children, 
population density, and characteristics of the housing stock.23  When estimating the models for 
HMDA data drawn from the 1992 through 1998 files, we used year-1990 census tract attributes 
as control measures.  When estimating for HMDA data obtained from 2000 through 2004, we 
used year-2000 census tract attributes for Z.  In addition, for all years, 1980 census tract 
attributes were used as instruments for the endogenous mortgage market variables.24 
To further clean the data, certain observations were dropped.  First, in calculating tract-
level mortgage attributes (e.g. purchases, denials), individual loan records from the HMDA data 
were dropped if the type or purpose of the loan could not be determined.  Second, we retained 
only conventional, home purchase loan records for which the size of the loan requested was less 
than the conforming loan limit stipulated by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in each given year.25  
Finally, in the empirical work to follow we focus on three sub-sample based on the type of 
lending institution: (i) all mortgage lending institutions, (ii) lending institutions that specialize in 
                                                 
23Recall also, as noted in the Introduction, the HMDA data do not provide information on individual loan applicant 
wealth or credit score (credit history).  However, as described earlier, our focus on secondary market behavior 
largely mitigates this limitation in the data because secondary market purchases are based on broad features of the 
pooled mortgages rather than on the characteristics of specific borrowers. 
  
24Results were little changed when we used 1970 tract attributes as instruments instead of 1980 values except that 
sample sizes were reduced because the geographic coverage of the census tracts was not as complete in 1970.  For 
this reason, we focus on the models that use the 1980 tract attributes as instruments. 
  
25We thank Glenn Canner in assisting us in identifying the relevant conforming loan size limits. 
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sub-prime mortgages,26 and (iii) non-financial institutions, mortgage bankers and brokers.  As 
noted earlier, sub-prime lenders serve higher risk loan applicants and should be especially 
sensitive to the presence of an active secondary market.  Non-financial institutions typically do 
not hold loans in portfolio and should also be unusually dependent on the secondary market. 
 
4.2 Sample Means 
 Table 2 presents sample means for the key mortgage market variables for each year of the 
HMDA data (1992 to 2004) for each of the groups of lenders noted above.  Note that the ratios 
reported in the last three columns (e.g. purchase/origination ratio) were formed first for each 
census tract and then averaged across tracts. 
Consistent with well known patterns, it is apparent that the level of mortgage activity 
across the market (Panel A) has increased over the 1992-2004 period, with roughly a 50 percent 
increase between 2000 and 2004.  This is true regardless of whether activity is measured based 
on applications, originations, or purchases.  Observe also that across all lenders (Panel A), there 
has been an increase in the tract average ratio of secondary market purchases relative to 
originations since 1994.  On the other hand, over that same period, the average tract shares of 
applications originated and denied have oscillated over a relatively small range and stood at 64 
percent and 16 percent for all lenders (Panel A), respectively, in 2004. 
 Comparing activity at all lenders (Panel A) to sub-prime specialists (Panel B), in every 
year, the ratio of denials to applications is sharply higher for sub-prime lenders (e.g., 26 percent 
versus 16 percent, respectively, in 2004).  This is consistent with the higher risk applicants 
served in the sub-prime segment of the market.  The ratio of secondary market purchases to 
                                                 
26 While the HMDA data does not permit identification of sub-prime loans, we are able to identify institutions that 
specialize in the origination of sub-prime loans, using a list provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.       
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originations is well above 1 for sub-prime specialists (Panel B) in 1996 and 1998, and then drops 
down to 0.85 in 2004.  In part, the values above indicate that some loan originators (e.g. 
commercial banks) purchase mortgages from other lenders and then re-sell the purchased loans.  
Although that practice does not influence the regression work to follow, it inflates the 
purchase/origination ratios in Panel B.27  A similar pattern is evident in Panel C for the non-
financial institutions (Panel C), indicative of the tendency of non-financial institutions (e.g. 
mortgage brokers) to also purchase and then resell a portion of their mortgages. 
  
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Origination Share of Applications 
 This section presents estimates of the regression models outlined in Section 3.  We begin 
with the origination share equation, expression (3.10).  In all cases, the estimation is based on a 
Tobit specification that restricts the range of the log of the origination/application ratio to be 
non-positive.  All of the models are estimated three times, first using IV methods treating 
purchases as endogenous with underserved tract status as the instrument (Table 3a), again using 
1980 SES variables as instruments (Table 3b), and a third time treating purchases as 
exogenous.28  In each case, estimates for each year of the HMDA data (1992-2004, even years) 
are reported.  Wald tests provided in Tables 3a and 3b indicate that the IV estimates typically 
differ significantly from the corresponding non-IV estimates.  In addition, the partial-F tests (also 
reported in Tables 3a and 3b) indicate that the instruments from both IV strategies are very 
strong predictors of purchases in the first stage.  For reasons outlined in the Introduction, we 
                                                 
27Purchase/origination ratios in excess of 1 can also reflect timing issues to the extent that some loans are sold in a 
year subsequent to the one in which they are originated. 
 
28The IV models were estimated using Newey’s (1987) two-step procedure in Stata9 SE. 
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favor using tract underserved status as the instrument of choice for the origination share 
regressions, and our discussion below focuses exclusively on Table 3a for that reason.  Results 
from Table 3b (using 1980 SES attributes as instruments) and Table 3c (non-IV models) are 
qualitatively similar, although the magnitudes of the estimated relationships are generally 
smaller. 
 As outlined in section 3, all of the models include MSA fixed effects for the largest 
MSAs and MSA size fixed effects for size categories associated with the many smaller MSAs.  
The models also include a rich set of census tract socioeconomic attributes (Z) that control for 
unobserved taste and risk factors that influence the demand and supply for credit.  Because of the 
reduced form nature of Z, we do not report the coefficients on those variables.  Instead, only the 
coefficients on secondary market purchases are reported. 
 Consider now Panel A of Table 3a.  This panel reports the estimated influence of 
secondary market purchases on all lenders.  Reading across columns, it is apparent that in each 
year of the HMDA data, secondary market purchases increase the share of applications 
originated by primary market lenders.  Also apparent is that the estimates decline somewhat over 
the 1992-2004 period.  Most recently, in 2000, 2002, and 2004, the estimated coefficient on 
purchases is 0.00348, 0.00200, and 0.00206, respectively.  Evaluated at the mean level of 
purchases in each of these years (from Panel A of Table 2), the average impact of purchases on 
CHP mortgage origination shares over the 2000-2004 period is 15.6 percent.  That magnitude is 
close to the denial rate in 2004 and suggests that, all else constant, the presence of an active 
secondary market activity has roughly halved the share of applications that are denied.29  On the 
                                                 
29This is a partial equilibrium result, of course.  If the secondary market were eliminated, very likely loan rates and 
other features of the mortgage market would be affected and those impacts would also influence denial rates.  The 
direction of such general equilibrium effects is difficult to assess. 
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whole, our estimates confirm that an active secondary market has an important impact on access 
to credit.30 
 To explore these patterns further, Panel B reports estimates for all lenders based just on 
those tracts where sub-prime lenders are active, while Panel C reports estimates based on the 
sub-prime lenders.  As before, both panels begin with 1996 given the small size of the sub-prime 
sector prior to that time. 
 Notice first in Panel C (sub-prime only) that the coefficient on secondary market 
purchases in 1996 and 1998 is imprecisely estimated and not significant.  That likely reflects the 
small size of the sub-prime sector at that time.  We focus, therefore, on estimates from 2000 on.  
Combining the coefficient estimates with the sample means in Table 2 (Panel C), the average 
impact of secondary market purchases on sub-prime origination shares is 10.9 percent.  That 
estimate is somewhat smaller than for the market overall (e.g. the 15.6 percent figure) owing to 
the lesser scale of secondary market activity in the sub-prime sector.  At the margin, the 
coefficient estimates in Table 3c make clear that secondary market purchases have a sharply 
higher impact on the sub-prime sector relative to the entire market: in 2000 and 2002, sub-prime 
effects are roughly ten times higher and in 2004 roughly 3.5 times higher.  These findings 
provide support for the idea that secondary markets enhance efficiency in part because of their 
greater ability to manage risk.31 
 As a further check, we also compare the impact of secondary market purchases on 
origination shares at non-financial institutions, Panel D.  Recall that non-financial institutions 
                                                 
30Our estimates are also consistent with the sharp increase in homeownership rates observed in the 1990s. 
  
31The average effect of secondary market activity on sub-prime origination/application ratios for 2000, 2002, and 
2004 is roughly 10 percent, somewhat smaller than the average effect on all lenders (15.6 percent) noted above.  The 
smaller average effect on the sub-prime sector reflects the smaller average number of purchases from sub-prime 
lenders as reported in Table 2, Panel B.  At the margin, however, it is clear that secondary market activity has a 
sharply higher impact on the subprime sector as noted above. 
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typically do not hold loans in portfolio, and therefore, are clearly dependent on the secondary 
market.  Once again, results are consistent with priors: in each year, the purchase coefficient for 
non-financial institutions (Panel D) is positive, significant, and typically of a larger magnitude 
relative to all lenders (Panel A), but in most years smaller than for sub-prime specialists (Panel 
C).  These findings further confirm that the secondary market helps most those institutions for 
which the greatest arbitrage opportunities exist.  This holds for institutions that largely do not 
retain loans in portfolio (e.g. non-financial lenders), and also for institutions that have a limited 
ability to diversify risks associated with their applicant pool (e.g. sub-prime lenders). 
 
5.2 Secondary Market Purchases Relative to Originations 
 As noted earlier, if markets are well functioning, primary lenders should not deny loans 
that could profitably be sold to secondary market institutions.  Under those conditions, denials 
should have no impact on purchases for any given level of originations.  If instead primary 
lenders sometimes make mistakenly deny loans that could have been profitably sold, then denials 
should reduce the number of secondary market purchases.  Tables 4a and 4b present estimates 
based on expression (3.11) to examine this question.  As before, Tobit models are used, in this 
case to restrict the range of purchases to be non-negative.  IV estimates based on 1980 SES tract 
attributes are presented in Table 4a while non-IV estimates are provided in Table 4b.  Once 
again, Wald tests (in Table 4a) confirm that the IV estimates typically differ from the non-IV.  In 
addition, partial F tests confirm that the instruments are strong predictors of denials of loan 
applications.  As before, only the coefficients on the key mortgage market variables are reported.  
Also, in each table (Tables 4a and 4b), Panel A reports results based on all types of primary 
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market lenders, while Panel B reports results based on just those primary market institutions that 
specialize in sub-prime lending. 
 Consider now the impact of denials on purchases.  In Panel A (all lenders), the estimated 
coefficient on denials is consistently negative, often insignificant or only weakly significant, and 
typically of small magnitude.  In 2004, for example, the coefficient on denials is -0.00098.  
Evaluated at the average number of denials in that year (18.3 as reported in Panel A of Table 2), 
this implies that primary market denials reduced the share of originations purchased on the 
secondary market by 1.79 percent, a relatively small amount.  Analogous measures from 
alternate years are similarly small in magnitude.  These patterns seemingly confirm that primary 
market lenders are largely cognizant of their opportunities to sell loans to the secondary market.  
This result is perhaps anticipated, but nevertheless is necessary if credit markets are to operate in 
an efficient manner. 
 Panel B repeats the exercise drawing on just the sub-prime lender specialists.  The 
dominant pattern for this panel is that the coefficients on denials are consistently insignificant, 
regardless of their magnitude and sign.  This could potentially reflect the small size of the sub-
prime sector.  However, by 2000, the sub-prime sector had become an important part of the 
mortgage industry.  An alternative explanation is that sub-prime specialist lenders often rely 
heavily on and hence are highly cognizant of opportunities to sell such loans in the secondary 
market.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 Although secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve the efficiency with 
which risk is managed, empirical evidence on this point has been largely absent.  This paper 
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begins to fill that gap using the mortgage market as an example.  Between 1992 and 2004, the 
secondary market for mortgage credit expanded dramatically.  In addition, beginning in the mid-
1990s, an active market for high-risk subprime loans began to emerge.  Together, these events 
provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of secondary markets on access to credit. 
 Our empirical work draws on a largely overlooked feature of the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA).  Specifically, HMDA collects information on all secondary market 
purchases of mortgages.  We aggregate these data to the census tract level and combine that 
information with census tract data from the Decennial census.  Results confirm that for each of 
our sample years (even years from 1992 to 2004), secondary market activity significantly 
increases the share of conventional home purchase (CHP) applications originated.  Moreover, 
this effect is substantially larger in the high-risk subprime sector.  Between 2000 and 2004, 
secondary market purchases increased the CHP origination share of applications by roughly 15.6 
percent, on average.  To put that in perspective, that effect is roughly equal to the year 2004 CHP 
denial rate.  Among subprime lenders, the overall impact of secondary market purchases is 
slightly smaller because of the lesser scale of sub-prime activity in the secondary market.   
However, at the margin, the impact of one additional secondary market loan purchase on CHP 
origination shares is roughly 3 to 10 times larger in the sub-prime sector than for all CHP 
lenders. 
 Results also confirm that in most years, denials of mortgage applications by primary 
market lenders had small negative effects on secondary market purchases.  This is consistent 
with the notion that primary lenders try not to deny loans that can be profitably sold to the 
secondary market, a necessary feature of a well functioning market.  That pattern is even more 
evident in the subprime sector, where demand by mortgage investors for subprime mortgage 
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pools expanded markedly over our period of analysis.  These findings suggest that subprime 
lenders are better at denying only those loans that cannot be profitably sold to the secondary 
market, and this also serves to increase access to credit for high-risk borrowers. 
 Overall, our results demonstrate that an active secondary market increases access to 
credit, in part because of its greater ability to manage risk.  That finding is important for credit 
markets in general, and for the mortgage market in particular.  Indeed, recent aggressive efforts 
by the Federal government have sought to expand secondary mortgage market activity in low-
income, minority, and other underserved neighborhoods, areas that are often associated with the 
presence of higher risk loan applicants.  These efforts include, for example, HUD guidelines that 
oblige Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase over 50 percent of their mortgages in such 
communities.  Our findings suggest that such efforts likely do serve to increase credit availability 
for residents of those neighborhoods. 
 As a final perspective, it is important to recognize that while expansion of secondary 
mortgage markets have increased access to credit, that outcome is associated with potential risks 
and is not always in the best interest of individual borrowers or the economy.  Most recently, the 
marked increases in mortgage default and foreclosure along with related bankruptcy of numerous 
subprime lenders underscore this point (see, for example, Bosworth (2007) and Morgenson 
(2007)).  A complete assessment of the wisdom of extending secondary market purchases into 
high-risk market segments requires a balancing of potential gains against heightened risk of 
borrower default and lender failures.  That exercise is left for future work. 
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Table 1 
Primary and Secondary Mortgage Market Activity in the 1990s 
All Mortgage Values are MEDIANS Across Tracts 
Based on Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
 
  Year Denial Rate2 
Origination 
Rate2 
2nd Market 
Purchase to 
Origination 
Ratio1 
Entire US 2002 0.120 0.693 0.931 
 1992 0.136 0.745 0.714 
Tract Income     
Less Than 25,000 2002 0.263 0.455 0.814 
Less Than 25,000 1992 0.255 0.556 0.333 
     
Tract Race and Ethnicity     
Percent Black > 50 2002 0.240 0.491 0.878 
Percent Black > 50 1992 0.250 0.588 0.500 
     
Percent Hispanic > 50 2002 0.211 0.546 0.975 
Percent Hispanic > 50 1992 0.267 0.568 0.571 
     
Lowest Secondary Market Purchase to 
Origination Ratio for CHP Loans1     
Huntington-Ashland WV-KY-OH 2002 0.338 0.486 0.481 
Binghamton NY 2002 0.167 0.681 0.517 
Johnstown PA 2002 0.192 0.666 0.541 
Utica-Rome NY 2002 0.177 0.627 0.562 
     
Highest Secondary Market Purchase to 
Origination Ratio for CHP Loans1     
Fresno CA 2002 0.129 0.679 1.201 
Anchorage AK 2002 0.078 0.764 1.198 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville CA 2002 0.148 0.676 1.171 
Eugene-Springfield OR 2002 0.107 0.708 1.163 
1Secondary market includes FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC, FAMC, commercial banks, savings banks and 
associations, life insurance companies, affiliates, and other purchasers.  MSAs reported in this portion of the 
table are ones with the lowest or highest secondary market CHP purchase-to-origination ratios from among all 
MSAs in the U.S. with 50 or more census tracts in 2000. 
2Denial and origination rates are relative to the sum of primary market originations, denials, withdrawals, 
approved but not accepted, and files closed because of incomplete information. 
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Table 2 
Sample Means for Mortgage Market Variables from the HMDA Data 
 
 
Panel A: All Lending Institutions 
Year Applications Originations 
Secondary 
Market 
Purchases Denials 
Originations/ 
Applicationsa 
Denials/ 
Applicationsa 
Purchases/ 
Originationsa 
1992 36.87 27.55 20.18 5.15 0.71 0.17 0.80 
1994 52.36 38.62 23.57 7.07 0.71 0.15 0.58 
1996 64.79 42.40 30.00 12.94 0.65 0.20 0.69 
1998 84.67 52.64 45.62 18.03 0.61 0.21 0.84 
2000 89.02 55.47 47.26 18.17 0.61 0.21 0.84 
2002 91.51 63.79 60.39 11.62 0.66 0.15 0.92 
2004 130.49 86.81 88.26 18.33 0.64 0.16 0.99 
 
Panel B: Sub-Prime Specialist Lending Institutions 
Year Applications Originations 
Secondary 
Market 
Purchases Denials 
Originations/ 
Applicationsa 
Denials/ 
Applicationsa 
Purchases/ 
Originationsa 
1992 - - - - - - - 
1994 - - - - - - - 
1996 2.79 1.22 1.18 0.71 0.46 0.22 2.6 
1998 9.52 3.34 3.28 2.55 0.35 0.25 1.79 
2000 13.51 5.28 3.21 4.17 0.39 0.30 0.71 
2002 14.07 6.66 5.64 3.39 0.45 0.25 0.97 
2004 23.13 12.30 10.19 5.71 0.50 0.26 0.85 
 
Panel C: Non-Financial Lending Institutions 
Year Applications Originations 
Secondary 
Market 
Purchases Denials 
Originations/ 
Applicationsa 
Denials/ 
Applicationsa 
Purchases/ 
Originationsa 
1992 10.06 7.09 7.71 1.56 0.68 0.18 2.54 
1994 17.50 11.61 10.68 3.05 0.65 0.18 0.98 
1996 23.40 11.85 12.21 7.02 0.55 0.25 1.28 
1998 36.84 17.40 18.48 11.29 0.50 0.25 1.15 
2000 28.82 15.28 17.77 7.00 0.53 0.22 1.32 
2002 29.47 17.57 19.24 5.05 0.57 0.19 1.33 
2004 54.76 32.04 34.25 9.23 0.56 0.19 1.11 
aReported ratios were first measured for each census tract and then averaged across tracts. 
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Table 3a 
Primary Market Originations (from All Institutions) of Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
Tobit Two-Step IV Estimates Using Underserved Tract Status as Instrument 
 
Dependent Variable: Log(Originations/Applications) 
(Absolute value of t-ratios in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A: All Lenders (All Tracts) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.00494 0.00405 0.00367 0.00271 0.00348 0.00200 0.00206 
 (8.09) (8.08) (6.55) (5.52) (4.78) (3.66) (12.02) 
Observations 48385 49970 50082 50338 50025 50027 50278 
Right-censored obs 1731 1018 566 287 216 286 268 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Partial F test from first stage 616.89 558.46 347.94 223.06 77.27 45.37 214.03 
        
Panel B: All Lenders (Just those Tracts in which Sub-Prime Specialists are Active) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.00224 0.00214 0.00319 0.00162 0.00198 
   (4.16) (4.35) (4.15) (2.86) (12.06) 
Observations   34629 46201 47767 47032 47288 
Right-censored obs   110 69 52 60 51 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b   0.0069 0.0321 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Partial F test from first stage   230.93 186.32 61.68 34.17 204.62 
        
Panel C: Sub-Prime Lenders 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.18226 0.04547 0.04415 0.02056 0.00674 
   (1.12) (1.02) (3.14) (2.98) (2.56) 
Observations   29223 42205 45354 44868 45268 
Right-censored obs   6443 1686 1337 1891 2481 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b   0.3728 0.9187 0.2232 0.2588 0.3195 
Partial F test from first stage   8.34 21.86 59.47 88.74 78.10 
        
Panel D: Non-Financial Lenders (All Tracts) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.09632 0.01687 0.01003 0.00157 0.00402 0.00747 0.00982 
 (4.39) (4.73) (2.33) (0.33) (0.46) (0.16) (5.70) 
Observations 40846 46639 47517 49088 48399 48435 49065 
Right-censored obs 7174 4352 2445 879 1140 1233 765 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b 0.0001 0.0001 0.1807 0.5934 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
Partial F test from first stage 25.62 149.98 85.71 28.31 6.52 0.15 38.18 
aAll models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of 
population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some 
high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed 
families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. 
bWald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. 
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Table 3b 
Primary Market Originations (from All Institutions) of Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
Tobit Two-Step IV Estimates Using 1980 SES Tract Attributes as Instruments 
 
Dependent Variable: Log(Originations/Applications) 
(Absolute value of t-ratios in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A: All Lenders (All Tracts) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.00452 0.00331 0.00120 0.00193 0.00151 0.00097 0.00046 
 (8.33) (9.55) (4.79) (11.62) (11.63) (12.16) (9.48) 
Observations 47854 48865 48935 49183 48881 48876 49135 
Right-censored obs 1607 933 555 280 209 281 264 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b 0.0001 0.0001 0.5354 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial F test from first stage 47.90 69.60 102.48 119.03 130.98 116.64 80.00 
        
Panel B: All Lenders (Just those Tracts in which Sub-Prime Specialists are Active) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.00088 0.00186 0.00159 0.00094 0.00047 
   (4.00) (11.93) (12.76) (12.73) (10.63) 
Observations   33981 45149 46664 45936 46206 
Right-censored obs   109 69 51 60 51 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b   0.8209 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Partial F test from first stage   83.79 114.49 129.72 116.77 80.55 
        
Panel C: Sub-Prime Lenders 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.03512 0.05778 0.02860 0.02349 0.00330 
   (1.39) (7.92) (6.69) (10.99) (5.07) 
Observations   28700 41288 44100 43629 44064 
Right-censored obs   6315 1666 1309 1864 2436 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b   0.7445 0.0177 0.7912 0.0001 0.1408 
Partial F test from first stage   19.78 51.99 75.17 75.22 71.13 
        
Panel D: Non-Financial Lenders (All Tracts) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.00364 0.00976 0.00622 0.00496 0.00562 0.00563 0.00226 
 (1.61) (7.09) (5.77) (7.77) (10.07) (12.59) (12.03) 
Observations 40582 45754 46405 47950 47278 47317 47939 
Right-censored obs 7130 4160 2425 862 1120 1218 753 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b 0.7538 0.0001 0.0756 0.1741 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Partial F test from first stage 44.56 57.76 83.67 97.91 101.48 93.50 62.49 
aAll models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of 
population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some 
high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed 
families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. 
bWald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. 
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Table 3c 
Primary Market Originations (from All Institutions) of Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
Tobit Non-IV Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: Log(Originations/Applications) 
(Absolute value of t-ratios in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A: All Lenders (All Tracts) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.00152 0.00150 0.00105 0.00111 0.00082 0.00050 0.00022 
 (22.83) (29.41) (22.95) (34.43) (31.23) (33.15) (28.73) 
Observations 47854 48865 48935 49183 48881 48876 49135 
Right-censored obs 1607 933 555 280 209 281 264 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
        
Panel B: All Lenders (Just those Tracts in which Sub-Prime Specialists are Active) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.00083 0.00109 0.00082 0.00049 0.00022 
   (19.12) (35.19) (31.70) (34.02) (30.19) 
Observations   33981 45149 46664 45936 46206 
Right-censored obs   109 69 51 60 51 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
        
Panel C: Sub-Prime Lenders 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases   0.04325 0.04065 0.02748 0.01293 0.00423 
   (16.75) (39.82) (35.09) (33.25) (32.54) 
Observations   28700 41288 44100 43629 44064 
Right-censored obs   6315 1666 1309 1864 2436 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
        
Panel D: Non-Financial Lenders (All Tracts) 
CHP 2nd Market Purchases 0.00293 0.00415 0.00432 0.00409 0.00305 0.00271 0.00086 
 (10.01) (21.72) (23.88) (35.84) (30.05) (35.02) (32.79) 
Observations 40582 45754 46405 47950 47278 47317 47939 
Right-censored obs 7130 4160 2425 862 1120 1218 753 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
aAll models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of 
population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some 
high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed 
families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. 
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Table 4a 
Secondary Market Purchases Relative to Originations (from All Institutions) 
of Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
Tobit Two-Step IV Estimates Using 1980 Tract SES Attributes as Instruments 
 
Dependent Variable: Purchases/Originations 
(Absolute value of t-ratios in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A: All Lenders (All Tracts) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CHP Loans Denied -0.00141 -0.00285 0.00006 -0.00064 -0.00735 -0.00370 -0.00098 
 (0.02) (1.20) (0.18) (3.22) (1.25) (2.23) (2.83) 
Observations 47854 48865 48935 49183 48881 48876 49135 
Left-censored obs 1563 1104 719 294 320 235 166 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b 1.0000 0.3300 0.5900 0.0800 0.2500 0.0300 0.0000 
Partial F test from first stage 25.17 59.46 99.03 126.82 71.53 72.52 61.43 
        
Panel B: Sub-Prime Lenders 
CHP Loans Denied   0.61744 -0.02407 0.03395 0.02172 -0.00147 
   (1.27) (0.11) (0.49) (0.30) (1.23) 
Observations   28700 41288 44116 43644 44063 
Left-censored obs   4240 1936 5065 1628 1176 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
Exog: Prob > Chi-square(1)b   0.1300 0.8800 0.7300 0.9000 0.5100 
Partial F test from first stage   19.78 51.99 75.17 75.22 71.13 
aAll models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of 
population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some 
high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed 
families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. 
bWald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. 
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Table 4b 
Secondary Market Purchases Relative to Originations (from All Institutions) 
of Conventional Home Purchase (CHP) Loans 
Tobit Non-IV Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: Secondary Market Purchases Divided by Originationsa 
(Absolute value of t-ratios in Parentheses) 
 
Panel A: All Lenders (All Tracts) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
CHP Loans Denied 0.00152 0.00150 0.00105 0.00111 0.00082 0.00050 0.00022 
 (22.83) (29.41) (22.95) (34.43) (31.23) (33.15) (28.73) 
Observations 47854 48865 48935 49183 48881 48876 49135 
Left-censored obs 1607 933 555 280 209 281 264 
1990 SES Controlsa 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
        
Panel B: Sub-Prime Lenders 
CHP Loans Denied   -0.12244 0.00803 0.05706 0.01272 -0.00068 
   (2.93) (0.28) (5.98) (1.42) (4.06) 
Observations   29223 42205 45174 44689 45087 
Left-censored obs   4319 1979 5191 1688 1203 
1990 SES Controlsa   16 16 16 16 16 
MSA/MSA-Size fixed effects    30 30 30 30 30 
aAll models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of 
population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some 
high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed 
families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. 
 
